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FINDING THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT
"MASTERMIND":
THE "CONTROL OR DIRECTION" STANDARD
FOR "JOINT" INFRINGEMENT
Keith Jaasmat
Abstract
In its 2007 decision in BMC Resources, Inc., v. Paymentech,
L.P., the Federal Circuit attempted to clarify the law regarding
liability for direct patent infringement under § 271(a) where the steps
of a patent claim are performed by more than one party. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit held that a defendant is not responsible for steps
in a patent claim performed by a third party, and consequently is not
liable for direct patent infringement where the defendant did not
"control or direct each step of the patented process." However, the
Federal Circuit provided only limited guidance regarding how to
determine whether a defendant has exerted sufficient control or
direction over a third party such that the defendant could be liable for
the acts of the third party.
In 2008 in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corporation, the
Federal Circuit may have introduced some unintended confusion into
the joint infringement analysis by stating that the plaintiff had failed
to identify a legal theory where the defendant "might be vicariously
liable for the actions of" the third parties that performed some of the
steps of the patented methods. At least one district court since has
read the holding of Muniauction as requiring a patentee to prove that
a defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of a third party in
order to satisfy the "control or direction" test.
Liability for 'Joint" infringement should not be limited to
situations in which a plaintiff can prove that a defendant is
vicariously liable for the acts of third parties, and agency law
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provides significant guidance regarding situations in which "control
or direction" should be found. This article suggests tests for
simplifying the determination as to whether a defendant has satisfied
the "control or direction" test. Cases involving acts performed by a
defendant's customers should be viewed differently from cases
involving other business relationships, such as those between a
defendant and suppliers, subcontractors, or other vendors. Rarely
will a defendant be found to assert sufficient "control or direction"
over its customers such that steps performed by customers will
support an infringement claim against the defendant. For other types
of business relationships, a test consisting of two questions would
help courts and practitioners determine whether there is sufficient
control or direction over the third party's performance of a step in a
patent claim such that the alleged infringer should be responsible for
the third party's acts:
Does the defendant's alleged "control or direction" relate to the
specific technology accused of infringement?
If so, did the defendant require the third party to perform the
relevant limitations of the claim in the manner provided for in
those limitations?
If the answer to both of these questions is "yes, " then the alleged
infringer should be held liable for steps performed by third parties.
Applying this test would greatly simplify the "control or direction"
inquiry and lead to more consistent results in cases involving joint
infringement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), "whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."' Usually, the
"whoever" accused of directly infringing a patent is a single
individual or entity accused of performing all of the steps of a
patented method or making, using, or selling a product with all of the
elements of a patented apparatus.2 However, when a patent has
network-related claims, such as business method patents covering
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
2. See, e.g., BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) ("Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or
element of a claimed method or product." (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Corp.,
520 U.S. 17 (1997))).
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ways of conducting business over the internet, there can be multiple
actors that potentially perform steps of a patented method or control
parts of a patented system: consumers who use their home computers
to access the internet, internet service providers who give consumers
access to the internet, and content providers who provide information
or services to internet users. Until recently, courts have varied greatly
in how they analyze patent infringement claims when multiple entities
are alleged to have performed the steps of a patent claim.
In BMC Resources, Inc., v. Paymentech, L.P.,4 the Federal
Circuit attempted to clarify the law regarding liability for direct patent
infringement under section 271(a) where the steps of a patent claim
are performed by more than one party. As the court pointed out,
"Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense, but it is limited to
those who practice each and every element of the claimed
invention."5 The BMC Resources court held that a defendant is not
responsible for steps in a patent claim performed by a third party, and
consequently is not liable for direct patent infringement, where the
defendant did not "control or direct each step of the patented
,,6
process. However, the Federal Circuit provided only limited
guidance regarding how to determine whether a defendant has exerted
sufficient control or direction over a third party such that the
defendant could be liable for the acts of the third party.
Shortly after its BMC Resources decision, the Federal Circuit
may have introduced some unintended confusion into the joint
infringement analysis in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corporation,
by stating that the plaintiff had failed to identify a legal theory where
the defendant "might be vicariously liable for the actions of' the third
parties that performed some of the steps of the patented methods.' At
least one court since has read the holding of Muniauction as requiring
3. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255
(2005).
4. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d 1373.
5. Id. at 1381 ("By contrast, indirect liability requires evidence of 'specific intent' to
induce infringement. Another form of indirect infringement, contributory infringement under §
27 1(c), also requires a mens rea (knowledge) and is limited to sales of components or materials
without substantial noninfringing uses.").
6. Id. at 1380. Although most "joint" or "divided" infringement cases have involved
method claims, some have involved system or product claims in which multiple parties control
one or more components of the accused system or multiple parties participating in the
manufacture of a product. See, e.g., Fisher-Barton Blades, Inc. v. Blount, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d
1126 (E.D. Wisc. 2008); Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc, 586 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2008),
discussed infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
7. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
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a patentee to prove that a defendant is vicariously liable for the
actions of a third party in order to satisfy the "control or direction"
test.8
This article discusses the state of the law of "joint" infringement
prior to the BMC Resources and Muniauction decisions and those
decisions themselves, as well as district court cases that have
attempted to apply the "control or direction" standard to a myriad of
business relationships. Specifically, this article analyzes the
requirement that where multiple actors perform the steps of a patent
claim, one party must be the "mastermind" of the patent infringement.
This article also examines a range of business arrangements that have
been found to be sufficient to show "control or direction" of one actor
by another, in contrast to other relationships, such as where the
defendant's customer is the third party that allegedly performed one
or more steps of the claim, which do not involve sufficient control or
direction to support direct patent infringement claims.
Lastly, this article suggests that cases involving acts performed
by a defendant's customers should be viewed differently from cases
involving other business relationships, such as those between a
defendant and suppliers, subcontractors, or other vendors. Rarely will
a defendant be found to assert sufficient "control or direction" over its
customers such that steps performed by customers will support an
infringement claim against the defendant. Section 271(b) and (c)
provide for liability for patent infringement by entities that induce or
contribute to the infringement of their customers, and allowing a
direct infringement claim to be based in part on the actions of a
party's customers would subvert the statutory scheme and mens rea
requirements for induced and contributory infringement.9
For other types of business relationships, this article suggests a
two-part test, consistent with agency law, for determining whether
there is sufficient control or direction over the third party's
performance of a step in a patent claim such that the alleged infringer
should be responsible for the third party's acts. Finding a defendant
liable for direct infringement based on the steps performed by third
parties would be appropriate in the case of affirmative answers to the
following questions:
Does the defendant's alleged "control or direction" relate to the
specific technology accused of infringement?
8. See Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008), discussed
infra notes 205-216 and accompanying text.
9. See BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1381.
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If so, did the defendant require the third party to perform the
relevant limitations of the claim in the manner provided for in
those limitations?
Applying this test would simplify the joint infringement inquiry
that has long proven difficult for courts and practitioners, even after
the BMC Resources and Muniauction decisions.
II. "JOINT" INFRINGEMENT BEFORE BMCRESOURCES
Prior to the BMC Resources decision in 2007, there was
disagreement among courts about whether the actions of multiple
parties taken together could support a finding of direct patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).' 0 Several cases, for instance,
had held that where multiple parties combined to perform all of the
steps of a patented method that all of the parties would be jointly and
severally liable for patent infringement, while others refused to find
patent infringement where one entity did not perform all of the steps
of a patent claim itself."
A. District Court and Regional Circuit Cases
Although "joint" infringement cases were relatively uncommon
in the decades prior to the BMC Resources case, a number of district
courts and courts of appeal decided cases in which the acts of multiple
parties were analyzed to determine whether there was patent
infringement by one or more of those parties. The standards applied
varied greatly, and, indeed, several courts applied standards far more
lenient than the "control or direction" standard later established by the
BMC court.
1. Contracting Out Steps
Generally, courts considering situations in which a defendant
contracted out the performance of one or more steps of a patented
process held that the defendant would be liable for patent
infringement.12 For instance, in Shields v. Halliburton Co., employees
10. For a general overview of the state of case law related to "joint" or "divided"
infringement prior to BMC Resources, see Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims,
33 AIPLA Q. J. 255 (2005).
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9' Cir. 1944) ("It is
obvious that one may infringe a patent if he employ an agent for that purpose or have the
offending articles manufactured for him by an independent contractor."); Ralston Purina Co. v.
Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1176, 1226 (D. Kan. 1984) ("It is well settled that a party cannot
avoid infringement merely by having a third party practice one or more of the required steps.");
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of two separate companies worked together on a number of jobs
performing the steps of the patented process. In addition to stating
the more general rule that "[i]nfringement of a patented process or
method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of the
process or method," 14 the Shields court held that "[w]hen
infringement results from the participation and combined action of
several parties, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent
infringement." 5
2. Steps Performed by Customers
Several courts found that a supplier-customer relationship could
be sufficient to make a supplier responsible for the acts of its
customers. For example, the court in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave,
Inc., held that for "direct infringement of a process claim, either a
single entity must perform every step of the method or, if two or more
entities perform different steps of the method, those entities must
have some connection to each other."16 The court had rejected a jury
charge that would have required a finding that the two entities "'work
in concert,' 'work together jointly,' or have an 'agency'
relationship."17 In finding that the defendant had contributed to direct
infringement by doctors who used stents supplied by the defendant,
the court was willing to rely upon steps actually performed by the
defendant to support a finding of underlying direct infringement by
the doctors because the defendant had "some connection" to the
physicians using the stents. Specifically, the defendant recruited
doctors to participate in clinical trials and the company and doctors
regularly gave each other feedback about how to use new products
and whether they worked.19 Therefore, the court held that acts
Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 110 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("That defendants
choose to have [one step] ... done by outside suppliers does not mitigate their infringement of
the overall process.").
13. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. La. 1980).
14. Id. at 1389 (citing Metal Film, 316 F. Supp. 96).
15. Id. (citing New Jersey Patent Co. v. Schaeffer, 159 F. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1908)).
16. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 349 (D. Del. 2006)
(emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In stating this rule,
the Cordis court relied upon Faroudja Labs, Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., Civ. No. 97-20010SW,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999), discussed infra notes 34-40, a case that
found that there was not a sufficient relationship between two parties to attribute the acts of one
to the other for the purpose of patent infringement.
17. Cordis, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 349 n.19.
18. Id. at 350.
19. Id.
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performed by the doctors and stent supplier could be taken together as
evidence of a predicate act of direct infringement supporting a finding
of contributory infringement against the stent supplier.20
In Applied Interact, LLC v. The Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc.,
the claims required certain steps to be performed by home computer
users. 21 The defendant argued that it was not liable for infringement
because it did not perform the steps that required action by its
22
customers.22 However, because the customers performing those steps
"act in accordance with [the defendant's] instructions," the court
found that there was "some connection" between the defendant and its
customers such that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was
denied.23
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. WR. Grace & Co., the court found the
defendant liable for infringement of several patent claims related to
catalyst preparation even though the defendant's customers performed
several steps of the patent claims.
Defendant knew at the time it sold each of its accused catalysts that
its customers would place the catalysts as sold by defendant into
their catalytic cracking units and that in the course of passage
through the catalytic cracking units, the catalysts purchased from
Grace would be subjected to the heating and calcining conditions
specified in [the claims], and that consequently all of the effects of
such heating or calcining would be achieved by defendant's
customers. Consequently, defendant was able to achieve all of the
benefits described by the patents for heating and calcining, while at
the same time foregoing the necessity of itself having to undergo
the expense of carrying it out. In this respect, defendant, in effect,
made each of its customers its agent in completing the
infringement step, knowing full well that the infringement step
would in fact be promptly and fully completed by those
customers. 24
20. Id. at 349-50; see also Civix-DDI, LLC v. Cellco Partnership, 387 F. Supp. 2d 869,
887 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that website provider Expedia "uses" computer terminals owned
by third parties by "provid[ing] its website to those computer terminals" and thus "puts into
service" the claimed remote access port; Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 2:02-CV-186,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006) (relying upon Cordis and other cases in
holding that a vendor-customer relationship was a sufficient connection to make the vendor
liable for acts of customer in a direct infringement claim).
21. Applied Interact, LLC v. Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc., 04 Civ. 8713 (HB), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19070, at *7-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
22. Id.at*l1.
23. Id. at *16-17.
24. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 253 (D. Conn. 1973).
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In contrast, in E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co. v. Monsanto Co., the
Court refused to hold Monsanto liable where a final step of a patent
process was performed by Monsanto's customer.25 The court found
that although a defendant could be liable for paying a third party to
perform one step of a patented process where the defendant
performed the other steps itself, none of the precedents relied upon by
the plaintiff held "that the third party who performs one step of a
patented process and then sells the resulting product to the direct
infringer ... is also liable as a direct infringer under § 271(a)."2 6
3. Case Requiring "Control"
In several other pre-BMC cases, courts required a showing of
"control" over the third party performing one or more steps of the
patented process that the defendant was accused of infringing. For
instance in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., the Ninth Circuit refused
to find either of two defendants liable for patent infringement where
two steps were performed by one defendant and one step was
performed by another defendant.2 7 "We question whether a method
claim can be infringed when two separate entities perform different
operations and neither has control of the other's activities."28
Conversely, in Free Standing Stuffer, Inc. v. Holly Development Co.,
the court found that although the three entities that performed
different steps of the patented process had separate corporate forms,
"[tihey are alter egos of each other." 29 The court found that two of the
entities that performed certain steps of the patented method were in
reality the advertising department and sales department of the
defendant.3
25. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 735 (D. Del.
1995).
26. Id. (distinguishing Shields, Crowell, and Metal Film, discussed supra notes 12-15)
(emphasis in original); see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. UCB Films PLC, No. 95 C 6351, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16535, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1997) (following EJ. DuPont and holding
that a defendant could not be liable for infringement under § 271(g) where the defendant "is
alleged to have performed at most an initial step of the process patent").
27. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291 (9b Cir. 1974). The court also
noted that neither defendant performed a fourth step.
28. Id. at 291-92. See also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., v. King Pharms., Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 455 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that ongoing royalty payments from one company to
another were not sufficient to establish joint infringement by the two companies).
29. Free Standing Stuffer, Inc. v. Holly Dev. Co., 187 U.S.P.Q. 323, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
30. Id.; see also Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 109 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (treating two patent infringement defendants as one entity where the two companies were
closely related and did not distinguish between the two companies in their own operations).
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In Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Industries, Inc.,3 1 the patent
covered a method of mixing wood particles and polymer resin, and
using that substance to make doors, windows, or frame molding. The
defendant door and window manufacturer moved for summary
judgment, claiming that it did not infringe the patent because it
purchased pre-made pellets of mixed wood particles and resin from a
supplier.32 In light of the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant
"dictates not only the ingredients and quantities of such ingredients
but also the process itself," the court determined that there were
material issues of fact as to whether the defendant had control over its
*33supplier's activities.
In Faroudja Laboratories, Inc. v. Dwin Electronics, Inc., the
plaintiff argued that "third parties who perform only certain steps of a
patent, where the performance of those steps follows the completion
of the earlier steps of the patent, can be found to be direct
infringers."34 The patent in Faroudja covered a method for
"converting film frames to television signals and improving the
resulting image quality."30 The plaintiff sued a company that
manufactured "line doublers" that could be used in conjunction with a
TV to receive a standard TV signal and output an improved TV
signal. Some of the signals received by the line doublers used by the
defendant's customers likely included signals previously converted
from film. 37 In attempting to hold the defendant liable for inducing or
contributing to the direct infringement of its customers, the plaintiff
argued that the customers committed direct infringement, despite the
fact that the step of converting film to a TV signal was performed by
separate entities. 8 The plaintiff argued that there was a sufficient
connection between the defendant's customers and the companies that
converted film to TV signals "by virtue of the copyright license that
exists when a person buys or rents a film that has been converted to a
television signal."39 However, the Court held that existence of a
31. Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1701, 1701 (N.D. Ill.
2003).
32. Id. at 1702.
33. Id. at 1703.
34. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., Civ. No. 97-20010SW, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22987, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,1999).
35. Id. at *4.
36. Id. at *5-6.
37. Id. at *6-7.
38. Id. at *14-15.
39. Id. at *17.
419
420 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
copyright license was not the sort of relationship that would make a
customer responsible for the actions of the film conversion company.
"A copyright license concerns such rights as distribution of copies,
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, and public
performance or display of a work. Any copyright license a viewer has
with the film owner exists independently of the film-to-television
transfer."4 0
Thus, prior to BMC Resources, some district courts merely
required "some connection" between a defendant and a third party,
such as a supplier-customer relationship, while others required
"control" similar to that later required by BMC Resources and
Muniauction.
B. Federal Circuit Cases
Although not addressing directly the circumstances under which
a defendant might be held responsible for patent steps performed by a
third party, several Federal Circuit cases prior to BMC Resources did
address analogous issues or otherwise touch on divided infringement
issues in dicta.
Unlike the district court cases that indicated that suppliers need
only have "some connection" with their customers for a plaintiff to
base a direct infringement claim on the acts of both, the pre-BMC
Resources Federal Circuit authority suggested a higher standard. For
instance, in Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that where the patent claims covered a photograph printing plate
including a diazo coating, because the defendant's customers, and not
the defendant, applied the coating, the defendant "cannot be liable for
direct infringement with respect to those plates but could be liable for
contributory infringement." 4 1
In International Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd., the defendant was accused of contempt for violating a permanent
injunction barring it from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing products covered by a U.S. patent. 42 The motion for
40. Id. at *17-18 (distinguishing E. Dupont, Shields, Free Standing Stuffer and Metal
Film, discussed supra notes 12-15, 25-26, 29-30 and accompanying text); see also id. at *15 ("It
is true that several district courts have found a party liable for direct infringement of a process
patent even where the various steps included in the patent are performed by distinct entities.
However, these cases indicate that some connection between the different entities justified that
finding.").
41. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
42. Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 361 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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contempt was a result of Samsung's manufacturing the accused
product abroad and selling it to a company, IXYS, which ultimately
imported them into the United States.43 Although there was a
fabrication agreement between Samsung and the importer, there was
"no evidence that Samsung exercises any control over IXYS or
participates in any activities of IXYS following delivery of [the
products] to IXYS in Germany. It is undisputed that Samsung and
IXYS are separate, unaffiliated companies, and that IXYS acts
independently of Samsung." " Thus, the Federal Circuit held that
there was no basis for attributing the acts of IXYS to Samsung and no
basis for finding Samsung liable for contempt for acts it performed
abroad.45
Similarly, in Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor
Danek, Inc., the Federal Circuit refused to attribute actions of doctors
who used orthopedic surgical implants to the manufacturer of those
implants.46 The claims required a "'lower bone interface operatively
joined to [a] bone segment,"' 4 7 something that only occurred when
the devices were implanted by doctors. 4 8 The plaintiff argued that the
manufacturer's "representatives appear in the operating room, identify
instruments used by surgeons, and thus in effect 'join' the anchor seat
to the bone." 4 9 Thus, according to the plaintiff, the case was
analogous to cases, such as Shields v. Halliburton Co., 50 where the
court had found a party directly infringed a method claim where one
of the steps was performed at the direction of that party.51 However,
the Federal Circuit rejected that argument and held that if anyone
made the infringing apparatus by attaching it to the bone "it is the
surgeons, who are, as far as we can tell, not agents of Medtronic," and
thus, there was no direct infringement by the device manufacturer. 52
In its Fromson, International Rectifier, and Cross Medical
opinions, the Federal Circuit seemed relatively clear that the acts of a
43. Id. at 1358.
44. Id. at 1361.
45. Id. at 1361-62.
46. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 1305.
48. Id. at 1309-11.
49. Id. at 1311.
50. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. La. 1980), discussed supra notes
13-15 and accompanying text.
51. Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1311.
52. Id.
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third party could only be attributed to a defendant for purposes of
finding direct infringement in very limited circumstances. However,
any such clarity was clouded by the Federal Circuit's opinion in On
Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.53 The claims at
issue covered a method of printing single copies of books that were
ordered by consumers and a book printer was accused of infringing
the patent where certain steps were allegedly performed by
Amazon.com when customers ordered books.54 Although the On
Demand case focused primarily on reversing the district court's claim
construction and the jury's finding of patent infringement based on
that construction, in the course of its opinion, the Federal Circuit
considered the district court's jury instruction regarding "joint
infringement":
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be
performed by one person or entity. When infringement results from
the participation and combined action(s) of more than one person
or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent
infringement. Infringement of a patented process or method cannot
be avoided by having another perform one step of the process or
method. Where the infringement is the result of the participation
and combined action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are
joint infringers and are jointly liable for the infringement. 55
The Federal Circuit stated: "We discern no flaw in this
instruction as a statement of law."56  Nonetheless, the jury
instruction's characterization of the law related to "joint"
infringement was not determinative because the Federal Circuit
concluded that even Amazon and the printer's actions taken together
did not infringe the patent at issue. While the Federal Circuit
approval of the jury instruction was arguably dicta, at least one
district court relied upon the Federal Circuit's tacit approval of a
broader joint infringement standard in On Demand to allow a direct
infringement claim based on the actions of multiple actors to proceed
past the summary judgment stage.
53. On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
54. Id. at 1334-36.
55. Id. at 1344-45.
56. Id. at 1345.
57. Id.
58. See Collegenet, Inc. v. XAP Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1055-56 (D. Or. 2006). See
also the reliance upon On Demand by the district court from Muniauction in giving its jury
instruction regarding joint infringement, infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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III. BMCRESOURCES, INC. V. PAYMENTECH, L.P.
In the wake of On Demand's seeming approval of broad joint
infringement theories came the Federal Circuit's BMC Resources, Inc.
v. Paymentech, L.P opinion.5 9 The claims at issue in BMC Resources
covered a "method for processing debit transactions without a
personal identification number (PIN)." 60 BMC accused Paymentech
of infringing the claims by performing services in which it would
route debit transactions from merchants to a variety of financial
institutions.6' The claims required certain steps to be performed by
the entity that provided the payment system at a retail location, and
other steps to be performed by debit networks and financial
institutions.62 BMC argued to the district court "that On Demand
changed the law governing joint infringement by multiple parties."63
However the district court determined that the approval of the jury
instruction in On Demand was dicta, and relying on other district
courts' opinions," it held that the defendant would only be liable if "it
59. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
60. Id. at 1375.
61. Id. at 1375-76.
62. One such claim was Claim 6 of United States Patent No. 5,870,456:
A method of paying bills using a telecommunications network line connectable to at least one
remote payment card network via a payee's agent's system, wherein a caller begins session
using a telecommunications network line to initiate a spontaneous payment transaction to payee,
the method comprising the steps of:
prompting the caller to enter a payment number selected from one or more
choices of credit or debit forms of payment;
prompting the caller to enter a payment amount for the payment transaction;
accessing a remote payment network associated with the entered payment
number, the accessed remote payment network determining, during the session,
whether sufficient available credit or funds exist in an account associated with
the payment number to complete the payment transaction, and upon a
determination that sufficient available credit or funds exist in the associated
account, charging the entered payment amount against the account with the
entered payment number, adding the entered payment amount to an account
associated with the entered account number, and storing the account number,
payment number and payment amount in a transaction file of the system.
U.S. Patent No. 5,870,456 col.12 1.52 - col.13 1.10 (filed Oct. 7, 1997).
63. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1378.
64. The district court relied upon Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., 66
U.S.P.Q.2d 1701, 1706 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F.Supp.2d
323, 349-50 (D. Del. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9' Cir. 1974) in fmding that "'courts appear to
require a close relationship or connection between the infringer and the other entity such that the
party accused of infringement directs or controls the actions of the other party."' (quoting BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3:03-DV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37746, at
*13 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006)).
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directed or controlled the behavior of the financial institutions that
performed those claimed method steps that Paymentech did not
perform."65 Finding no evidence of control or direction, the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant.6 6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered "the proper standard
for joint infringement by multiple parties of a single claim," noting
the general rule that "[d]irect infringement requires a party to perform
or use each and every step or element of a claimed method or
product."67 BMC argued that the Federal Circuit's opinion in On
Demand "sanctioned a finding of infringement by a party who
performs some steps of a claim in cases where a patent claims a new
and useful invention that cannot be performed by one person.",6 BMC
also argued that On Demand, in approving of the jury instruction at
issue, adopted a "'participation and combined action' standard as the
type of 'connection' a plaintiff must show to prove joint
infringement." 69
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments and agreed with the
district court that the On Demand court's statements regarding joint
infringement were dictum, holding that "On Demand did not change
this court's precedent with regard to joint infringement."70 The court
observed that both Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc.,7 and Cross
Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. ,72 found
that a party could not be liable for direct infringement because it did
not perform all the steps of a claim. The Federal Circuit went on to
observe that "[c]ourts faced with a divided infringement theory have
also generally refused to find liability where one party did not control
65. 498 F.3d at 1378.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1379.
69. Id. at 1380.
70. Id.
71. Fromson, 720 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1983) (finding no direct infringement by
manufacturer who performed the first step of a process claim even where its customer
performed the other step of the claim), discussed supra note 41 and accompanying text.
72. Cross Med. Prods., 424 F.3d at 1311 (rejecting patentee's efforts to combine the acts
of surgeons with those of a medical device manufacturer to find direct infringement of an
apparatus claim), discussed supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
73. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1380. Earlier in the opinion, the Court observed that in
Cross Med. Prods.,424 F.3d at 1311, "this court refused to attribute the acts of surgeons in
making the claimed apparatus to the medical device manufacturer because the medical device
manufacturer representative, who appeared in the operating room and identified instruments for
the surgeons, did not direct the surgeons' actions." 498 F.3d at 1379.
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or direct each step of the patented process."7 4 However, control could
be exercised contractually:
A party cannot avoid infringement, however, simply by contracting
out steps of a patented process to another entity. In those cases, the
party in control would be liable for direct infringement. It would be
unfair indeed for the mastermind in such situations to escape
liability. District courts in those cases have held a party liable for
infringement.75
Nonetheless, the court made it clear that the standards for finding
a defendant liable for the actions of a third party would be relatively
stringent, and found such stringency necessary in light of the statutory
scheme for patent infringement:
This court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or
direction for a finding of joint infringement may in some
circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to
avoid infringement. Nonetheless, this concern does not outweigh
concerns over expanding the rules governing direct infringement.
For example, expanding the rules governing direct infringement to
reach independent conduct of multiple actors would subvert the
statutory scheme for indirect infringement. Direct infringement is a
strict-liability offense, but it is limited to those who practice each
and every element of the claimed invention. By contrast, indirect
liability requires evidence of "specific intent" to induce
infringement. Another form of indirect infringement, contributory
infringement under § 27 1(c), also requires a mens rea (knowledge)
and is limited to sales of components or materials without
substantial noninfringing uses. Under BMC's proposed approach, a
patentee would rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect
infringement.76
The Federal Circuit recognized that parties could try to cooperate
to avoid direct patent infringement by dividing the activities covered
by a claim, but explained that these potential problems could be
avoided by patentees through careful claim drafting:
74. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4961 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006) ("'No court has ever
found direct infringement based on the type of arms-length business transaction presented
here."'); Faroudja Labs. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., Civ. No. 97-20010SW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th
Cir. 1974) (expressing doubt over the possibility of divided infringement liability)).
75. Id. at 1381(citing Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 ( W.D. La.
1980)).
76. Id.
425
426 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
A patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by
a single party. In this case, for example, BMC could have drafted
its claims to focus on one entity. The steps of the claim might have
featured references to a single party's supplying or receiving each
element of the claimed process. However, BMC chose instead to
have four different parties perform different acts within one claim.
BMC correctly notes the difficulty of proving infringement of this
claim format. Nonetheless, this court will not unilaterally
restructure the claim or the standards for joint infringement to
remedy these ill-conceived claims.77
Applying its standards for divided infringement, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the finding of no infringement because BMC failed
to produce any sufficient evidence that Paymentech directed or
controlled the debit networks or financial institutions that performed
several steps of the claims.78 Although BMC's evidence showed that
Paymentech provided data to the debit networks, there was no
evidence that Paymentech also provided instructions or directions
regarding the use of that data.79 While BMC argued that instruction or
directions could be inferred or that "the data themselves provide
instructions or directions," BMC had not provided any evidence to
support either theory.80 There was even less evidence of control or
direction over the financial networks, where there was not even a
contract between Paymentech and the financial networks.8 ' In the
absence of control or direction over either the debit networks or the
financial institutions, the Federal Circuit found that Paymentech "did
not perform or cause to be performed each and every element of the
claims," and thus summary judgment of non-infringement was
affirmed.82
IV. MUNIAUCTION, INC. V. THOMSON CORPORATION
Less than a year after the BMC Resources decision, the Federal
Circuit had the opportunity to apply its BMC Resources holding in
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corporation.8 3  The claims in
77. Id. (citing Lemley, supra note 3, at 272-75 and Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc.,
126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
78. Id. at 1381.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1381-82.
81. Id. at 1382.
82. Id.
83. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
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Muniauction covered a method of auctioning fixed income financial
instruments over the internet, where one of the steps required
"inputting data associated with at least one bid for at least one fixed
income financial instrument into [a] bidder's computer via [an] input
device."84 Muniauction asserted its patent claims against Thomson's
BidComp/Parity system, which allowed home and business users at
remote locations to bid on municipal bonds and other securities.85 The
jury found that Thomson infringed Muniauction's patent and awarded
over $38 million in damages, which the district court enhanced to
nearly $77 million based on the jury's finding of willful
infringement.86 The district court denied Thomson's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, in which Thomson argued, inter alia,
that it did not infringe the claims under the proper standard for joint
infringement.87 Thomson appealed, and while the appeal was
pending, the Federal Circuit issued its BMC Resources opinion.8 8
In reviewing the infringement finding, the Federal Circuit noted
that "the only theory of infringement presented by Muniauction is that
of so-called joint infringement."89 The parties agreed that no single
entity performed all of the steps of the asserted methods; for instance,
the inputting step of the claims was completed by the bidder, whereas
most or all of the remaining steps were performed by the auctioneer's
system such as Thomson's BidComp/Parity system. 90 "The issue is
thus whether the actions of at least the bidder and the auctioneer may
be combined under the law so as to give rise to a finding of direct
infringement by the auctioneer." 91
The Federal Circuit observed that its holding in BMC Resources
"was founded on the proposition that direct infringement requires a
single party to perform every step of a claimed method," 92 but that the
BMC Resources opinion also "recognized a tension between this
proposition and the well-settled rule that 'a defendant cannot thus
84. Id. at 1322.
85. Id. at 1323.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1328.
90. Id. at 1328-29.
91. Id. at 1329.
92. Id. (citing BMC Resources, Inc., v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)). The Muniauction court also relied upon the Federal Circuit's decision in NTP, Inc.
v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that users of
accused Blackberry system could not infringe method claims in the United States because one
step of the method was performed in Canada).
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avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else carry
out one or more of the claimed steps on its behalf.'" 9 3 Accordingly,
the Muniauction court reaffirmed that "where the actions of multiple
parties combine to perform every step of a claimed method, the claim
is directly infringed only if one party exercises 'control or direction'
over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the
controlling party, i.e., the 'mastermind."' 94 In contrast, "[a]t the other
end of this multi-party spectrum, mere 'arms-length cooperation' will
not give rise to direct infringement by any party."95
Turning to the case before it, the Federal Circuit considered
whether Thomson sufficiently "controls or directs" bidders "such that
Thomson itself can be said to have performed every step of the
asserted claims."96 The district court had relied on the Federal
Circuit's apparent approval of the jury charge in On Demand Machine
Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.9 7 in finding that joint infringement
required a connection less that direct control, giving a jury instruction
that read as follows:
Consider whether the parties are acting jointly or together in
relation to the electronic auction process. Are they aware of each
other's existence and interacting with each other in relation to the
electronic auction process? Is there one party teaching, instructing,
or facilitating the other party's participation in the electronic
auction process? These are the types of questions that you should
ask in making your decision on this issue. If you find that there is a
sufficient connection between Thomson and the bidders and the
issuers that used Thomson's process, then you could find Thomson
liable for direct infringement.98
The Federal Circuit held that the reliance on On Demand was
erroneous in light of the fact that the finding of no infringement in On
Demand was not based on the relationship between the parties. 99
"Moreover, none of the questions identified by the jury instruction are
relevant to whether Thomson satisfies the 'control or direction'
standard of BMC Resources. That Thomson controls access to its
93. Id. (quoting BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1379).
94. Id. (quoting BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1380-81).
95. Id. (quoting BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1371).
96. Id.
97. On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
discussed supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
98. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329.
99. Id. (quoting BMC Resources, Inc., v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed.
Cit. 2007)).
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system and instructs bidders on its use is not sufficient to incur
liability for direct infringement."oo "Under BMC Resources, the
control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law
would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable
for the acts committed by another party that are required to complete
performance of a claimed method." 01 Because "Thomson neither
performed every step of the claimed methods nor had another party
perform steps on its behalf, and Muniauction has identified no legal
theory under which Thomson might be vicariously liable for the
actions of the bidders," the Federal Circuit held that Thomson did not
infringe the claims as a matter of law and vacated the verdict against
it. 102
V. DISTRICT COURT CASES APPLYING BMCRESOURCES AND
MUNIA UCTION
Since the BMC Resources decision, the rate at which district
courts have decided issues related to "joint" or "divided"
infringement has increased significantly. District courts have
considered whether a principal exerted sufficient "control or
direction" over two primary kinds of third parties: (1) customers, and
(2) vendors, subcontractors, or other business partners. With respect
to customers, courts have rarely found that the principal had control
or direction over its customers sufficient to make the principal
responsible for steps in a patent claim performed by those
customers. 10 3 Only in the case of a software program that
automatically caused a customers' computer to perform a step of a
patent claim has a principal been found potentially responsible for
steps performed by its customers.'0 With respect to vendors and
other business partners, courts have required that one party be
identified as the "mastermind" of the patent infringement and that the
principal be vicariously liable for or have contractual control over the
vendor's performance of the steps that the principal does not perform
100. Id. at 1330.
101. Id. (citing BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1379). The Federal Circuit also cited Int'1
Rectifier v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 361 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("reversing district
court's ruling that Samsung violated a permanent injunction prohibiting infringement in the
United States on the grounds that Samsung did not control or participate in the extraterritorial
activities of a third party such that the acts of the third party were not attributable to Samsung"),
discussed supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 107-138 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
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itself. os Some courts have applied a standard of "control or direction"
that likely was more stringent than the Federal Circuit had
contemplated in BMC Resources or Muniauction, by holding that
vicarious liability is the only way in which a defendant can be found
to have sufficient "control or direction" over a third party.'06
A. Customers
1. Insufficient Control or Direction Over Customers
Like the Federal Circuit in Muniauction, most district courts
considering claims of direct infringement have determined that
operators of accused systems are not responsible for the steps of
claimed methods that are performed by users of that system.
In Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, the
patent at issue covered a method of downloading data from a remote
server in response to a query entered by a remote computer user. 0 7
The parties agreed that the claims required steps to be taken by both a
website operator and a remote computer user.108 The first step of the
claim required a remote computer user to enter a query into their
computer.109 The Patentee argued that this action was "controlled" by
the accused website operator because it "put[] Javascript programs on
the remote user's computer to allow the process to begin.""o
However, the district court concluded that this was insufficient to
show "control or direction" over the system under the BMC
Resources and Muniauction standards:
Plaintiff has, in no way, alleged that remote users are contractually
bound to visit the website, it has not alleged that the remote users
are Defendant's agents who visit the website within the scope of
their agency relationship nor has it alleged any facts which would
render Defendant otherwise vicariously liable for the acts of the
remote user. Using Plaintiffs analogy, Defendant may give home
users the keys to the truck, but home users have no obligation to
use those keys to start the truck and drive away.
105. See infra notes 153-218 and accompanying text.
106. See Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (quoting
Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330), discussed infra notes 205-214 and accompanying text.
107. Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1332-
33 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
108. Id. at 1335.
109. Id. at 1332 n.1.
110. Id. at 1335.
Ill. Id.
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Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted.112
In Keithley v. The Homestore.com, Inc., the claims covered an
internet-based system for accessing real estate information. 113 In
addition to having a number of steps performed by the entity
receiving and storing real estate related information, the claim at issue
also required end users to access data files through a series of
inquiries.114 The patentee accused the operator of real estate related
websites such as www.realtor.com and www.homebuilder.com of
infringing the claims, and the defendant moved for summary
judgment." 5 The patentee claimed that the website operator directed
and controlled users by including terms and conditions on its website
that were characterized as a "binding contract," limiting and
controlling access to certain features, and monitoring users' actions to
track which files were accessed by users of the website." 6 The district
court found that this was insufficient to show "control or direction,"
observing that although the website operator "allows users access to
its websites, [it] does not cause those users to access any particular
information."117 Because the patentee did not show that the website
operator had another party perform steps on its behalf or otherwise
show that the operator was vicariously liable for the actions of the
website users, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted." 8
In Desenberg v. Google, Inc., the patent at issue covered a
method of linking service providers (such as contractors) and clients
112. Id. at 1336; see also McKesson Info. Solutions, LLC, v. Epic Sys. Corp., Civ. Case
No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88158, at *13-16 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009)
(following Global Patent Holdings in holding that provider of system for electronic
communication between doctors and patients did not directly infringe patent where claims at
issue required patient to perform steps of the claim).
113. Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 978, 979 (N. D. Cal. 2008).
114. Id. at 980.
115. Id. at 979.
116. Id. at 984.
117. Id. at 985.
118. Id. at 995. See also PA Advisors, LLC v. Google, Inc., Case No. 2:07-cv-480 (RRR),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28500 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2010), in which the patent covered various
methods of generating internet search results. Id. at * 5. Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit,
sitting by designation, granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Yahoo! and
Google where one of the limitations of the asserted claim required the user of a home computer
to initiate a search request. Id. at *25-26. Judge Rader rejected the plaintiffs argument that
Google and Yahoo! performed this step by offering suggestions and spelling changes after a
home user made a request. Id. at * 27. "[E]ven where search suggestions or spelling changes are
provided by the system, the user is still first required to initiate a search request" and "continues
to choose the course of the search without the 'control or direction' of the accused search
engines." Id.
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in real-time based on project and price criteria.l 9 Desenberg,
proceeding pro se, accused Google's AdWords system of infringing
the patent.120 The district court determined that the claims at issue
required "a series of interactions, transmissions and communications
between 'users' and 'providers,' similar to the multi-step patent
process involving merchants and customers in BMC Resources."l21
"Google argue[d] that its interactions with users and AdWords
advertisers [were] arms-length transactions, and that Desenberg ha[d]
not alleged that Google acted as a 'mastermind' over the process.122
The court agreed, noting that Desenberg "has failed to properly allege
that Google exercises even a modicum of control over Google
AdWords users to satisfy the Federal Circuit's joint infringement
standard" and granted Google's motion to dismiss.12 3
In Advanced Software Design Corporation v. Fiserv, Inc., the
claims covered a process for validating a check that involved printing
an encrypted code on the check and subsequently decrypting the
information so that the check validator could decide whether the
check was genuine and should be honored.12 4 The patentee asserted
that the claims were infringed by Fiserv's "Secure Seal" system for
printing a graphical "seal" on checks that could only be decoded by
someone with the proper key for decrypting it. 12 5 Fiserv sold its
systems to banks, some of whom used the system to print and validate
checks.' 26 Other banks provided the software to their account holders
to print checks that were subsequently decrypted and validated by the
bank.127 In some circumstances, Fiserv acted as a check validator for
its bank customers, in which case Fiserv would decrypt the seals on
checks printed using its system.12 8 The district court concluded that
the patentee could not prove that Fiserv directly infringed the claims
because Fiserv did not print checks or encrypt check data.12 9 The
court held that the patentee "failed to show that Fiserv participates in
119. Desenberg v, Google, Inc., 08 Civ. 10121 (GBD)(AJP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66122, at * 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009).
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *19.
122. Id. at *23-24.
123. Id. at *24.
124. Advanced Software Design Corp., v. Fiserv, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926-27 (E.D.
Mo. 2009).
125. Id. at 925-26.
126. Id. at 926.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 930.
2010] FINDING THE INFRINGEMENT "MASTERMIND"
any scheme to print checks with encrypted control codes. At most,
Fiserv sells software that enables its customers to encrypt and print
checks. But this fact alone is not sufficient to establish that Fiserv is a
direct infringer."' 3 0  Accordingly, Fiserv's motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement was granted.' 3'
Under the "control or direction" standard established by BMC
Resources and Muniauction, it is likely that cases with fact scenarios
similar to those in the pre-BMC Resources cases Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic Ave, Inc.,132 Applied Interact, LLC v. The Vermont Teddy
Bear Co., Inc.,133 and Mobil Oil Corp. v. WR. Grace & Co.134 would
have been decided differently. The Cordis court had required only
"some connection" between the defendant and its physician
customers.' 35 The Applied Interact court found that there was some
connection between the defendant and its customers because the
customers "act[ed] in accordance with' [the defendant's]
instructions."l 36 In Mobil Oil Corp. v. WR. Grace & Co., the court
found the defendant liable for direct infringement even though the
defendant's customers performed several steps of the patent claims,
simply because the defendant knew "full well that the infringement
step would in fact be promptly and fully completed by those
customers."l 37 In short, merely enabling, instructing, or encouraging
customers to perform steps of a patented method, or even knowing
that those steps would be performed, is not sufficient under the BMC
Resources standard to show that an accused infringer has exerted
"control or direction" over those customers.'3 8 Something more is
needed.
130. Id. (citing Joy Tech., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("holding
that the sale of an apparatus" to perform a patented process "is not direct infringement because a
method or process claim is directly infringed only when the process is performed").
131. Id. at 931.
132. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D. Del. 2002), rev'd on
other grounds, 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
133. Applied Interact, LLC v. Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc., 04 Civ. 8713 (HB), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19070 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005).
134. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973).
135. Cordis, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
136. Applied Interact, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19070 at *16-17.
137. Mobil Oil, 367 F. Supp. at 253.
138. See also Medtronic, Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., No. C-07-0567 MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 36168, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (holding that evidence that the defendant
"instructs and trains physicians on the use of the accused products" was insufficient to raise a
triable issues as to whether the defendant had sufficient "control or direction" over its physician
customers such that the defendant could be liable for direct infringement); Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo,
Inc., Case No. 02-C-736, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 35944, at *27-28 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2008)
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2. Customer Control through Computers
That "something more" could, in certain circumstances, be
triggered by computer software. In BMC Resources, the Federal
Circuit indicated, without explicitly deciding, that software provided
by a system operator that caused a user of the system to perform a
patent step might be sufficient to make the provider responsible for
the actions of the user.139 BMC argued that the data it provided to
debit network "provide instructions or directions" to the debit
networks, and rather than rejecting this as a possible source of
"control or direction," the Federal Circuit found that BMC had
presented no evidence to support that theory. 140
It is possible that satisfying the "control or direction" standard is
not even necessary if the system designer retains sufficient control
over its software distributed to remote locations such that it could be
treated as performing steps of the claimed method itself. For example,
in American Patent Development Corporation, LLC v. Movielink,
LLC, the claims covered a method of limiting the number of times a
computer user could view a downloaded video program.14' The
claims at issue included steps for storing video at a user site, decoding
data establishing a number limit for authorized viewing at the remote
site, and blocking access to the video product once the use limitations
for the video are exceeded.1 42 Movielink was accused of infringing
the patent, and it was undisputed that these steps of the patent were
performed by the Movielink Manager software at user sites.143 The
patentee alleged that the software was "part of a 'unitary' Movielink
system that is controlled or directed by a Movielink 'mastermind.'""
The court distinguished the patent at issue from that in Global Patent
Holdings v. Panthers BRHC LLC,14 1 finding that the patent at issue
includes no step (such as a step where a user requests a video
product) that must unequivocally be performed by a remote
(holding that jury could reasonably conclude that instructions provided to customers with an
accused product were included "as a matter of convenience for their customers, not to control
the conduct of their customers").
139. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
140. Id.
141. Am. Patent Dev. Corp., LLC v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 227 (D. Del.
2009).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 236.
144. Id.
145. Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335
(S.D. Fla. 2008), discussed supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
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computer user. Rather [it] merely requires the operation of
components at both a "central station" and a "user site." Although
this fact is suggestive of two distinct entities performing the steps
of Claim 1, this is not required. 146
The American Patent court noted that its analysis was
nonetheless complicated by the fact that the "user site" consisted of a
computer owned and operated by an individual other than
Movielink.147 Movielink argued "that it 'did not control its customers'
computers, or the software running on them,"' and Movielink's expert
argued that "the plain meaning of 'control' must include the ability to
fundamentally manage or influence the functioning of the thing
allegedly being controlled."'l 4 8 However, in light of Movielink
documents describing the Movielink Manager as being highly
integrated with software on Movielink's server and testimony
regarding Movielink's continuing capacity to revoke customer
licenses, the court concluded that there were genuine issues of fact
regarding whether Movielink exercised continuing control over the
Movielink software on users computer.149 "Put another way, the Court
cannot conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Movielink Manager software running on customers'
computers is simply one component in a distributed-but centrally
controlled-Movielink system." 50 The court rejected Movielink's
argument that the patentee had not pleaded a joint infringement
theory, concluding that the patentee would not "be required to invoke
joint infringement to the extent they are proceeding on a theory that
the Movielink service is a single, delocalized system."'s Movielink's
motion for partial summary judgment of non-infringement was
granted. 152
146. American Patent, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id. at 237.
150. Id. Movielink also argued that certain steps of the claim were carried out by
Microsoft DRM software, but a Movielink employee had testified that Movielink employed and
relied upon the DRM software to make the Movielink Manager software function. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 238; see also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150, 162
(D.R.I. 2009) (granting judgment as a matter of law to Microsoft, but rejecting argument that
Microsoft could not infringe patent claims requiring remote users where "there can be little
doubt Microsoft makes, uses and controls the Clearinghouse server and is the 'mastermind' of
the software, causing each local and remote component to (arguably) complete 'infringement'
by the entire system"); Girafa.com, Inc. v. lAC Search & Media, Inc., Civ. No. 07-787-SLR,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88796, at *8 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding that where claims
required "displaying" of a "thumbnail video image," software products that cause a preview
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Thus, computer software may provide patentees with two means
of avoiding dismissal under the "control or direction" test: By
enabling patentees to argue that steps performed at user locations are
actually performed by the system owner through their continuing
control over the software, and by enabling the patentees to argue that
the software itself enables the system owner to direct and control the
actions of the user.
B. Vendors, Subcontractors, and Other Business Partners
When the third party alleged to have performed one or more
steps of a patented method is not a customer, but rather a business
partner, such as a supplier or subcontractor, deciding whether there is
sufficient "control or direction" over the third party can be more
challenging. The question, as summarized by the Muniauction court,
is where on the "multi-party spectrum" the amount of control exerted
by the defendant over the third party lies. 153 At least one court has
found that unless the defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of
the third party, there is not sufficient "control or direction" over the
third party such that steps performed by the third party are attributable
to the defendant. 15 4
Notwithstanding the relative stringency of the "control or
direction" test, a number of relationships between principals and their
business partners have been found to involve sufficient control or
direction such that the principal is liable for the actions of their
business partner in a direct infringement claim.
1. Cases Finding Evidence of Sufficient Control or
Direction
In TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., the claims involved a prepaid
calling card system in which the calling cards would be activated or
re-charged when consumers paid for them, which was accomplished
image to be displayed automatically could infringe while products "requiring a user to 'mouse-
over' or click on a hyperlink in order for a preview image to appear" could not).
153. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 829 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (discussing the
"spectrum" of multi-party relationships between arms-length cooperation and "'control or
direction over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e.,
the mastermind") (quoting Muniauction , 532 F.3d at 1329); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc. 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 120 (D. Mass. 2009) (discussing "the continuum between an
arms-length relationship and vicarious liability for determining direction or control" established
in Muniauction).
154. See Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 839, discussed infra notes 205-216 and accompanying
text.
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by using an on-site activation terminal to contact a central server
through a telephone network to obtain a stored security number.s5 5 In
its motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict finding
that it infringed the claims, AT&T asserted that it did not directly
infringe the patent through its system for activating calling cards.' 6
AT&T claimed that other companies provided the activation
platforms and the data terminals, located at places such as Wal-
Mart.'57 However, AT&T's corporate representative testified that the
activation platform company "acted on behalf of AT&T," and AT&T
required the information received from Wal-Mart in connection with
the activation for the cards to be in a specific format.' 58 Accordingly,
the district court denied AT&T's motion for judgment as a matter of
law because there was no evidence of joint infringement. 59
In Fisher-Barton Blades, Inc. v. Blount, Inc., the claims covered
a method of making rotary cutting blades that included heat-treating
the blades to elevate the hardness to a specified hardness level.' 60 It
was undisputed that an independent entity, Superior, neither owned
nor controlled by the defendant, performed the heat treating step.16
The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it did not
"direct or control" the heat treating, but its evidence established only
that Superior was a separate legal entity, not that the defendants did
not "direct or control the heat-treating process." 62 In light of
evidence that the defendant "directs that the blades meet a certain
hardness and Superior hardens them to meet that specification," the
district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.' 63
In Rowe International Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., the claims at issue
covered a computer jukebox that could download music from a
central server. 16 In responding to the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment of infringement, the defendant Ecast relied upon Cross
Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,'6 5 arguing that Ecast
155. TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 568-69 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
156. Id. at 567.
157. Id. at 577.
158. Id. at 578.
159. Id.
160. Fisher-Barton Blades, Inc. v. Blount, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132-33 (E.D. Wis.
2008).
161. Id. at 1134.
162. Id. at 1143.
163. Id. at 1143, 1152.
164. Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
165. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding that implant manufacturer was not liable for direct infringement where device was not
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only made the memory that allowed jukeboxes to download songs,
that separate companies made the jukeboxes, and that the systems
only became infringing when they were assembled by businesses
using the jukeboxes.'6 6 The record indicated that Ecast itself marketed
complete jukebox and memory systems.167 Alternatively, the court
concluded that even if Ecast did not market complete jukebox
systems, there was evidence that it asserted control or direction over
the jukebox companies' manufacturing activities.16 1 Specifically,
Ecast regarded the jukebox manufacturers as "partners" who made
jukeboxes "for us" pursuant to specific technical specifications.'69
"There is no suggestion that these firms were independently making
jukeboxes that would work with the Ecast system. On the contrary, at
least under the original contract with Ecast, [one jukebox
manufacturer] was required to obtain Ecast's permission to
manufacture jukeboxes for the Ecast network." 170 Accordingly, the
court found that Ecast's arguments regarding the lack of control or
direction were not a basis for denying the plaintiffs summary
judgment motion.171
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., the patent covered a
method of automatically designing and manufacturing orthodontic
appliances based on a scan of a patient's teeth.172 Most of the claims
covered scanning a mold of the patient's teeth, but one claim covered
scanning the patient's teeth in their mouth, a step necessarily
performed by dentists.173 Align was accused of infringement and
argued that there was no showing that it exerted control or direction
over the dentist's scanning of teeth.174 However, the district court held
that "Ormco's identification of specific orthodontists who have
provided Align with data from direct scans of patients teeth, as well
as communications about Align's work with scanner manufacturers to
develop more efficient scanning techniques" was sufficient to raise a
infringing until installed by doctors), discussed supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
166. Rowe Int'l, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 930-31.
167. Id. at 931.
168. Id. at 932.
169. Id. at 933.
170. Id.
171. Id. Plaintiff s summary judgment motion was denied on other grounds.
172. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
173. Id. at 1066-67.
174. Id. at 1067.
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material issue of fact regarding Align's control or direction of the
dentists. 175
In In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, the
patent claims at issue covered methods of processing information
from interactive phone calls.176 The patentee accused DirecTV of
infringing the claims through its Interactive Voice Response ("IVR")
systems at DirecTV's customer call center, which allowed customers
to order sports and adult programming and to receive other customer
service without speaking with a live operator.177 The parties agreed
that West Interactive Corp. provided a substantial portion of each of
the services accused of infringement. 178 DirecTV argued that it did
not direct or control West.17 9 Specifically, DirecTV argued that (1) its
contracts with West provided that each party was a principal, and
neither was the agent of the other; (2) West was an independent
contractor; and (3) DirecTV did not control the architecture of West's
proprietary software that operated the IVR system.180 "In sum,
DIRECTV concludes that West was independently responsible for the
design, development, programming and implementation of West's
IVR and for their 'day to day operation.',,s'8 In response, the patentee
argued that DirecTV asserted direction and control over West,
pointing out that: (1) DirecTV provided West with statements of work
regarding the necessary functionality of the of the IVR, and West
coded the IVR applications accordingly; (2) West would not change
the IVR applications without a Statement of Work from DirecTV; (3)
West would perform business reviews and testing of all IVR
applications before implementing them; and (4) DirecTV provided
West with necessary information from DirecTV's customer
database.'8 2 However, the court found the parties' arguments about
different types of control failed to focus on the claimed invention.'8 3
According to the Court:
175. Id. This reliance on the minimal link between the dentists and Align seems to have
been closer to the "some connection" standard applied by some courts before BMC Resources.
See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
176. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, Case No. 07-CV-2322-RGK
(FFMx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72134, at *40 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2009).
177. Id. at *43.
178. Id. at *43, *62.
179. Id. at *63.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *63-64.
183. Id. at *64-65.
439
440 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
Although the parties appear to disagree about the amount of
control and direction DirecTV exerts over West, the Court notes
that they are discussing two different issues. DirecTV points out
that West controlled the underlying architecture and proprietary
software. Katz points out that DirecTV directed the specific
implementation of the IVR applications. Thus, it appears that
DirectTV had control over the IVR applications that used hardware
and software controlled by West. However, neither party attempts
to link what DirecTV does or does not control/direct with the
specific technology accused of infringement. To the extent that
DirecTV directs or controls the accused West technology,
DirectTV can be liable for infringement even if West has an arms
length relationship with DirecTV. 84
Accordingly, the court found that there was a factual dispute
regarding "whether DirecTV directed or controlled the specific West
components/steps that are accused of infringement." 85
2. Cases Finding Insufficient Control or Direction
Other courts have found that various business relationships did
not involve sufficient "control or direction" such that a defendant
could not be found to be responsible for steps performed by a third
party.
In Gammino v. Cellco Partnership, the claims at issue covered
processes and apparatuses for preventing telephones from making
international calls.186 The defendant owned and operated pay
telephones and purchased telephone services from various local
providers, some of which included international call blocking.' 87
Because there was no evidence that the defendant performed the call
blocking steps of the patents (or even knew how those steps were
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at *65. But see Phoenix Solutions, Inc. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., Case No. CV 08-
984 MRP (SSx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114977, at *36-40 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (granting
DirecTV's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims covering particular
parts of a voice recognition service where West, not DirecTV, controlled the allegedly
infringing elements). For an additional case finding factual issues regarding the existence of
sufficient direction of control, see Privasys, Inc. v. Visa Int'l, No. C 07-03257 S1, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86838, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007) (granting motion for leave to amend
complaint where plaintiff, who did not perform all of the steps of the claimed method, had
indicated it could show that Visa "'provides instructions or direction regarding the use of its
payWave card to merchants and banks involved in the process"' and has "'contractual
relationships' with 'the financial institutions"').
186. Gammino v. Cellco Partnership, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
187. Id. at 397.
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performed) or directed another party to perform those steps, the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment."'
In epicRealm Licensing, LP v. Franklin Covey Co., the claims
covered a method of responding to requests for web pages in which a
web server would route requests for web pages with dynamic content
to a "page server." 189 The page server would process those requests,
thus releasing the web server to concurrently handle other incoming
requests for web pages.190 The plaintiff sued Herbalife, alleging that
its website infringed the patent.1 9' Herbalife claimed that its website
was "owned, selected, controlled, and operated exclusively by an
independent hosting company." 92 Although Herbalife controlled the
content on the website and provided data used to respond to requests
made by users of the website, the court found that "[n]one of these
activities constitute control by Herbalife over how [the hosting
company] managed dynamic data requests," which was the conduct
accused of infringing the claimed methods.193 Accordingly, the Court
recommended that Herbalife's motion for partial summary judgment
on the patentee's claim for "joint" direct infringement be granted.194
In Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc.,19 5 the
claims covered an integrated medical database that included modules
for dispatching emergency medical teams, tracking their movement to
and from an accident scene, and managing the diagnosis, treatment,
and billing of the patient. The patentee sued two companies,
emsCharts and Softtech, that provided software that covered billing
and EMS dispatching respectively, and the jury found that they jointly
infringed the asserted claims.196 In considering emsCharts' motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court observed that although
emsCharts had been a distributor of Softtech's dispatching software
for a year, the agreement between the two companies defined the
relationship as not creating any agency or partnership.197 Moreover,
188. Id. at 398-99.
189. epicRealm Licensing, LP v. Franklin Covey Co., 644 F. Supp. 2d 806, 807 (E.D. Tex.
2008).
190. Id. at 810-11.
191. Id. at 807.
192. Id. at 810.
193. Id. at 821.
194. Id.
195. Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1565, 1566 (E.D. Tex.
2009).
196. Id. at 1566-67.
197. Id. at 1568.
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emsCharts did not receive any rights to the software other than the
right to promote it to potential users.'9 8 Although the parties had
submitted a joint bid to at least one customer, "emsCharts did not
direct Softtech submit the bid. The two companies discussed and
agreed to submit the bid." 199 The court concluded that "[t]here was
no evidence at trial to show that the Distributorship Agreement
imposed the types of duties or responsibilities upon Softtech that
would support a finding of direction or control by emsCharts" and
granted emsCharts' motion for judgment as a matter of law.200
In The Friday Group v. Ticketmaster, the claims covered a
method of offering a ticket purchaser the opportunity to purchase a
recording of a concert when they purchased tickets to the concert and
distributing copies of the recording to the purchaser after the
concert. 2 0 1 The patentee sued Ticketmaster and a number of concert
promoters, accusing them of jointly infringing the patent.202 Although
the plaintiff alleged that "'direction or control' is exercised over the
practice of the steps of one or more claims of the patent," the plaintiff
did not give "any indication as to which defendant exercised this
direction or control."2 03 Because the plaintiff failed to allege "that a
single defendant practiced each and every element or that any
defendant would be liable for joint infringement" the court granted
the defendants' joint motion to dismiss.2 0
The court in Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc.,20 5 gave the "control or
direction" test a particularly narrow reading. The patent at issue
claimed a method for delivering medical services in which a
physician located at a central video-conferencing station would
diagnose and recommend a treatment for patients located at remote
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1569.
201. Friday Group v. Ticketmaster, Case No. 4:08CV01203 JCH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100529, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. December 12, 2008).
202. Id. at *3.
203. Id. at *12-13.
204. Id. at *13-14. But see Tune Hunter, Inc. v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., LLC, Civ. Act.
No. 2-09-cv-148-TJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31980 (Apr. 1, 2010) (concluding that patent on
its face required multiple actors, but declining to dismiss complaint where plaintiff had not yet
had discovery of issue of defendant's "control or direction" over other parties); Actus, LLC v.
Bank of Am. Corp., Civ. Act. No. 2-09-CV-102-TJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11398, at *7-8
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2010) (refusing to dismiss complaint because of failure to allege any
theories ofjoint infringement where the claims had not yet been construed to require actions by
multiple actors).
205. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
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videoconferencing locations.206 The claims of the patent required
several specific steps to be performed by the doctors located at the
central video-conferencing station, including "diagnosing a medical
condition" of a patient at a remote site and "providing instructions via
said video-conferencing system" to the doctor at the remote site to
treat the patient at the remote site. 20 7 The accused telemedicine
company provided videoconferencing network links between
physicians in which the operators of those systems "enter into
contracts with physicians or physician groups who agree to work as
independent contractors in providing diagnostic and treatment
services."208 The contracts specifically provided for the doctors to be
available to provide care to a certain number of patients or on a
certain schedule and to provide care for a specified rate.2 0 9 However,
the contract also identified the physicians as "independent contractors
who exercise independent judgment and maintain discretion over the
medical care they provide to the patients."210
In analyzing the law of joint infringement, the Emtel court read
BMC Resources and Muniauction as teaching
that when the actions of multiple parties combine to perform the
steps of a claimed method, direct infringement requires that the
"mastermind," the controlling party, exercise such direction or
control over the entire process that it is vicariously liable for the
actions of the other parties in performing the steps of that
process.
The court concluded that the contractual provisions between the
network providers and the doctors "only set basic parameters for the
physicians to follow that do not affect, much less control, how they
exercise their judgment in performing the medical work that is
required" by the claims of the patents.212 In other words, according to
the court: "The degree of control must be such that the defendant
could be vicariously liable for the third party's performance."2 13
Finding a lack of control sufficient to make the operators vicariously
206. Id. at 815-16.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 817.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 831 (emphasis added). But see Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc ,
614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 120 (D. Mass 2009), discussed infra notes 230-234 and accompanying text.
212. Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
213. Id. at 839.
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liable for the actions of the doctors, the court granted summary
214judgment of non-infringement.
In imposing a stringent requirement that only by proving
vicarious liability could a plaintiff prove that a defendant had
sufficient "control or direction" over a third party, the Emtel court
likely was too restrictive in its application of the rule, and read
"direction" out of the "control or direction" test. 2 15 Even though the
operators caused the doctors to perform diagnoses and suggest
courses of treatments over the operators' video conferencing systems,
and indeed required the doctors to perform those steps at certain times
and a minimum number of times, the Emtel court's reading of
Muniauction would require the operators to be vicariously liable for
all actions of the doctors.
But the issue was not, for example, whether the operators could
be vicariously liable for the malpractice of a doctor, but whether there
was sufficient control or direction over the performance of the steps
of the patented method such that the operators could be liable for
patent infringement. The claims of the patent do not require the
diagnosis or recommendation of a course of treatment to be
performed in a certain way, such that the physician's judgment or
discretion would determine whether or not the claims were infringed.
Instead, the claims required that a diagnosis be performed and a
treatment be recommended over a video-conferencing system, a step
caused by the operators' contractual requirement that the physicians
appear for a certain number of consultations.2 16 The steps were not
performed at the whim of the physicians, but indeed, were performed
because of the operators, and would not have been performed over a
214. Id. at 840.
215. It is unclear whether the Federal Circuit anticipated that there could be a situation
where a defendant did not have "control" over a third party, but nonetheless had sufficient
"direction" over the third party such that the defendant would be liable for those third parties'
performance of steps of a patent claim. Definitions of "direct" and "direction" are very similar
to "control," and indeed use "control" or similar terms in their definitions. See, e.g., BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 491 (8b ed. 2004) (direct: "I. To aim (something or someone). 2. To cause
(something or someone) to move on a particular course. 3 To guide (something or someone); to
govern. 4. To instruct (someone) with authority. 5. To address (something or someone).);
wEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 517 (Deluxe 2nd ed.1983) (Direction:
"I. a directing, management, control .... 3. instruction for doing, operating, using, preparing,
etc. 4. an order; command."). However, given that the Federal Circuit did not simply say that a
defendant must have "control," over a third party, courts should consider whether a defendant
who is not necessarily vicariously liable for the actions of a third party nonetheless sufficiently
directed the actions of that third party such that the third party's actions should be attributable to
the defendant for direct patent infringement purposes.
216. Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 815-17.
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video conferencing system as the claims require but for the actions of
the operators.
As the court in In re Katz recognized, the question should be
whether the defendant "does or does not control/direct" conduct
related to "the specific technology accused of infringement."2 17 In the
Emtel case, the "control or direction" asserted by the operators related
directly to the performance of the claim limitations at issue" 8 and
should have been sufficient to avoid summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.
VI. LESSONS IN DRAFTING: THE LIMELIGHT NETWORKS CASES
In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit observed that many of
these problems-of-proof involving claims that required actions by
multiple actors could "usually be offset by proper claim drafting."2 1 9
Specifically, "[a] patentee can usually structure a claim to capture
infringement by a single party." 22 0 The difference that drafting can
make to the viability of an infringement claim is made clear by two
cases involving patents covering similar technologies that were
brought against the same defendant: Level 3 Communications, LLC v.
Limelight Networks, Inc.221 and Akamai Technologies, Inc. v.
222Limelight Networks, Inc. In the Level 3 case, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement was denied
because the claims only required the performance of steps by a single
party.223 In the Akamai case, the claims required steps to be
performed by Limelight's customers, and because the plaintiff failed
to prove Limelight exerted the required control or direction over its
217. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, Case No. 07-CV-2322-RGK
(FFMx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72134, at *64 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2009), discussed supra notes
176-185 and accompanying text.
218. See Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 827-28.
219. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
220. Id. (citing Lemley, supra note 3, at 272-75). See also Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 840
(The claims could have avoided the "joint" infringement issue by being written to cover "the
telemedicine videoconferencing system provider receiving in a central medical
videoconferencing station a physician's diagnosis of a medical condition of a patient in a
satellite medical care facility, transmitting that diagnosis to the satellite medical care facility,
receiving instructions provided by the physician to treat a patient at the satellite facility; and
transmitting those instructions to the satellite medical facility.").
221. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D. Va.
2008).
222. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass 2009).
223. Level 3, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 659-60.
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customers, Limelight's motion for judgment as a matter of law of
non-infringement was granted.224
The differences in claims between the Level 3 case and the
Akami case are instructive. Both cases generally involved methods of
using server networks that could respond to data requests to high
volume websites by placing servers throughout the country that could
provide data to web users, instead of providing data solely from a
single, central server. In the Level 3 case, a representative claim
covered:
12. A method, in a system which includes (a) a repeater server
network including a plurality of repeater servers, (b) a plurality of
subscribers to the repeater server network, wherein the plurality of
subscribers are entities that publish resources via at least one
origin server, and wherein the at least one origin server is distinct
from the plurality of repeater servers, (c) a repeater selector
mechanism constructed and adapted to identify, for a particular
request, a repeater server to handle the request, and (d) a subscriber
verifying mechanism constructed and adapted to verify whether an
entity is an one of the plurality of subscribers to the repeater server
network, the method comprising:
on at least some of the repeater sewers [sic] in the repeater
server network, replicating some or all of the information
available on the at least one origin server;
upon receipt of a client request for information, the client
request being for a resource which is embedded in another
document, determining, using at least the subscriber verifying
mechanism, whether the client request is for information from
a known entity that publishes resources to the repeater server
network; and
serving the information, from the repeater server identified by
the repeater selector mechanism, when the client request is
determined to be for information from one of the plurality of
subscribers being an entity that publishes resources to the
repeater server network.225
The limitations in the Level 3 case made numerous references to
"subscribers" (content providers) and "clients" that would likely be
different than the owner of the system with multiple repeater servers.
However the steps to be performed under the claim-replicating
224. Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23.
225. U.S. Patent No. 6,654,807 col.29 11.11-37 (filed Dec. 6, 2001) (emphasis added); see
Level 3, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 657-58 n.2 (listing asserted claims).
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information, using a subscriber verifying mechanism, and serving
information from the repeater servers-would all be performed by the
system owner.
In Akamai, however, the claims included steps to be performed
by content provider customers of Limelight. In Akamai, a
representative claim covered:
19. A content delivery service, comprising:
replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of
content servers managed by a domain other than a content
provider domain;
for a given page normally served from the content provider
domain, tagging the embedded objects of the page so that
requests for the page objects resolve to the domain instead of
the content provider domain;
responsive to a request for the given page received at the
content provider domain, serving the given page from the
content provider domain; and
serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a
given content server in the domain instead of from the content
.226provider domain.
Thus, as indicated by the highlighted text, the "tagging of
embedded objects" of a requested page and "serving the given page
from the content provider domain" would be performed by the
content provider customer, rather than by Limelight itself.
In Level 3, Limelight argued that "a finding of infringement is
precluded because subscriber content always originates at
subscribers' own servers, and Defendants cannot be held liable for the
actions or devices of its subscribers."227 The court conceded that
"[t]he claims undeniably describe, by way of preamble, a system that
assumes the existence of external elements such as origin servers,
clients, client requests, and subscriber content .... However, the
steps comprising the methods implemented in the ... system do not
themselves appear to involve multiple parties." 22 8 Accordingly, the
court distinguished the facts of the case from Muniauction and BMC,
and did not even need to consider whether Limelight's relationship
226. U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 col.19 11.6-20 (filed May 19, 1999) (emphasis added); see
Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
227. Level 3, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
228. Id.
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with its clients met the "control or direction" standard of those
cases. 229
In contrast, in the Akamai case, defendant Limelight was more
successful in its reliance upon Muniauction and BMC Resources in
light of the form of the claims. In Akamai, the jury had found that
Limelight infringed the claims at issue, and awarded $45.5 million in
damages. 230 After initially denying a motion for judgment as a matter
of law of non-infringement, the district court reconsidered its ruling in
light of the Muniauction decision.231
The Akamai court had read the BMC Resources case as leaving
"open the possibility that direction or control adequate for a finding of
direct infringement might exist where an accused infringer provided
data to another entity along with instructions regarding use of that
data" and suggesting "that the existence of a contractual relationship
between the accused infringer and the entity performing other steps of
the accused method was a significant consideration." 2 32  in
considering the impact of the Muniauction decision, the Akamai court
asked: "[I]s vicarious liability a necessary condition to satisfy BMC
Resources' control or direction standard, as Limelight asserts, or is it
merely a condition sufficient to find infringement within the spectrum
of possible interactions ranging from an arms-length agreement to
'contracting out steps of a patented process to another entity?"' 2 33 The
court concluded that vicarious liability was not an absolute
requirement, but one way in which a defendant could be liable for the
acts of others, along with "having 'another party perform steps on its
behalf."' 2 34 Thus, unlike the Emtel court, the Akamai court did not
find that vicarious liability was a requirement for a finding of
sufficient control or direction.23 s
229. Id. at 659-60. See also Yangaroo Inc. v. Destiny Media Techs. Inc., Case No. 09-C-
462, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82052, at *6-7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2009) (denying motion for
summary judgment of non-infringement despite plaintiff's failure to plead "control or direction"
where the court had not yet determined through claim construction whether the claims required
actions by multiple parties).
230. Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
231. Id. at 96, 119.
232. Id. at 117-18.
233. Id. at 120 (quoting BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
234. Id. (quoting Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
235. See Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 839 (S.D. Tex. 2008),
discussed supra notes 205-216 and accompanying text.
2010] FINDING THE INFRINGEMENT "MASTERMIND"
However, the Akamai court did find that Muniauction
established "a new data point on the continuum between an arms-
length relationship and vicarious liability for determining direction or
control."236 The court found that "Muniauction establishes that
direction or control requires something more than merely a
contractual agreement to pay for a defendant's services and
-,,237instructions or directions on how to utilize those services."
Accordingly, the court found that Limelight did not assert sufficient
direction or control over its customer's performance of the "tagging"
or "serving the given page from the content provider domain" steps:
There is no suggestion that the agreements between Limelight and
its customers for content delivery services were other than the
result of an arms-length contract negotiation. Akamai has
identified no legal theory under which Limelight might be
vicariously liable for the actions of the content providers. The first
step of claim 19 of the '703 patent, serving the initial web page
from the content provider's domain, is performed by the content
provider whether it subscribes to Limelight's services or not.
Limelight's customers, following Limelight's instructions, do
modify the embedded objects of their web pages or alter their DNS
records so that requests for the objects resolve to the content
delivery service domain, rather than the content provider domain,
in order to take advantage of Limelight's service. However, this
step is performed by Limelight's customers not because they are
contractually obligated to do so; rather they do so because they
wish to avail themselves of Limelight's service. Under
Muniauction, this is insufficient to establish the requisite direction
or control by Limelight of its customers necessary to find it liable
for direct infringement. 238
Thus, Limelight's motion for judgment as a matter of law was
granted.239 In large part because its claims had been drafted to require
actions by multiple actors, Akamai's claims failed while Level 3's,
which had no such requirements, lived on to fight another day.
VII.PROPOSED TESTS FOR "CONTROL OR DIRECTION"
Short of simply deciding on a case-by-case basis where a
specific fact scenario falls along the "control or direction" continuum,
a process likely to lead to inconsistent results and a lack of
236. Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
237. Id. at 121.
238. Id. at 122.
239. Id. at 123.
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predictability for litigants, how can practitioners and courts determine
whether an accused "mastermind" exerts sufficient "control or
direction" over third parties to make them liable for those third parties
actions in a direct infringement claim? Some basic guidelines,
supported by the law of agency, would simplify cases involving
"joint" or "divided" infringement.
Before jumping into the "control or direction" inquiry, lawyers
and courts should determine whether the claims even require steps to
be performed by multiple actors. As suggested by Level 3 and Emtel,
claims may require the existence of third party actors as part of a
claimed system, and even include claims that cover the principal's
receipt of information or materials from, or sending information or
materials, to those third parties, as long as the claim limitations
themselves require action by only one entity.240 With such claims,
there is no joint or divided infringement, and thus no need to inquire
whether the defendant exerts "control or direction" over the third
party.
If the alleged infringement does require steps to be performed by
multiple parties, courts and lawyers should ask whether the third party
whose actions are sought to be attributed to the accused defendant is a
customer of the accused, or is a supplier, vendor, or in some other
business relationship with the accused. If the former, only in very rare
circumstances will there be sufficient "control or direction" over the
customer such that actions of those customers may be attributed to the
accused. If the latter, it should be determined whether the alleged
"control or direction" relate to the specific technology accused of
infringement and whether the accused party requires the third party to
perform steps of the claim in the manner claimed by those steps.
A. Customers
Supplier-customer relationships are usually the epitome of
"arms-length" transactions. A customer buys a product from a
240. See Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 654, 659
(E.D. Va. 2008)( "The claims undeniably describe, by way of preamble, a system that assumes
the existence of external elements such as origin servers, clients, client requests, and subscriber
content ... [h]owever, the steps comprising the methods implemented in the ... system do not
themselves appear to involve actions by multiple parties."); Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (The
claims could have avoided the "joint" infringement issue by being written to cover "the
telemedicine videoconferencing system provider receiving in a central medical
videoconferencing station a physician's diagnosis of a medical condition of a patient in a
satellite medical care facility, transmitting that diagnosis to the satellite medical care facility,
receiving instructions provided by the physician to treat a patient at the satellite facility; and
transmitting those instructions to the satellite medical facility.").
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supplier is usually free to do with that product as it wishes. 241 In the
rare cases that a customer is restricted in the use of a product, it would
likely be unusual for a supplier to require a customer to perform a
particular process with or on the product purchased. Thus, it is
unlikely that a customer would be contractually required to perform a
step of a process covered by a patent method claim so that the
supplier could be found to have sufficient control or direction over the
customer for the purpose of a direct infringement claim.
As recognized by the BMC Resources court, the statutory
provision covering induced infringement and contributory
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) & (c) provide for remedies against
suppliers who sell products with the intent to actively induce
infringement or without substantial non-infringing uses.242 Liability
under these provisions requires specific intent on the part of the
supplier, and liberally allowing claims against suppliers based on the
actions of their customers that were not contractually compelled by
the suppliers would "subvert the statutory scheme for indirect
infringement." 24 3 With a loose standard of "control or direction"
covering most supplier-customer relationships, "a patentee would
rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect infringement."244 Of
course, in light of the requirement that there be direct infringement in
order for there to be indirect infringement, patentees with only
method claims requiring actions by multiple actors could likely not
resort to an indirect infringement theory if multiple actors performed
the steps of an accused claim but there was no mastermind that
directed or controlled all of the steps.245 However, just as careful
241. In the case of software licensees, the licensee may be prohibited from using the
software in certain manners, such as making copies or using the software for illegal purposes,
but would generally not be affirmatively required to use the software in a certain manner, such
as using certain functionality of the software or using the software for a particular type of
business. Thus, while a software licensor may restrict the rights to the use of the software that a
licensee has, such restrictions should not constitute sufficient "control or direction" to make the
licensor responsible for the acts of the licensee software user.
242. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
243. Id.; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1379 ("Indirect infringement requires, as a predicate, a finding that some party
amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct infringement."). At least one
commentator considering the issue of divided infringement has suggested that BMC Resources
"control or direction" standard is too narrow, and has proposed that tort theories such as the
"prima facie tort" doctrine, civil conspiracy, and combined nuisance could be used to find
liability for direct patent infringement where more than one actor performs the steps of a patent
claim. See Joshua P. Larsen, Liability for Divided Performance of Process Claims After BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41 (2008).
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drafting can avoid method claims requiring multiple actors, so too can
most patents supporting method claims also support product claims
that would be amenable to indirect infringement claims under
appropriate circumstances.
Beyond contractual compulsion, one other situation in which the
actions of a customer could be attributable to the supplier is where
software provided to the customer automatically causes the customer
to perform the step of a method. As discussed in American Patent
Development Corporation, LLC v. Movielink, LLC,2 4 6 if the accused
maintains sufficient control over the software itself, notwithstanding
its locations on a remote user's computer, any steps performed by the
software would actually be performed by the accused, making an
inquiry into the "control or direction" over the customer unnecessary.
However, even if the software itself is not controlled by the accused,
if the system operates such that the software automatically performs
steps in response to actions taken by the accused and does not require
any discretion or action by the remote user, it could be argued that the
accused actually "controls" the performance of the step through its
software.247 In such situations, because the principal is either
performing the step itself or ensuring that it is performed through
computer code, finding direct infringement on the part of the principal
would be appropriate.
B. Vendors & Other Business Relationships
When the third party allegedly performing one or more steps of
an accused method (or making one or more components of an accused
system) is a vendor, a subcontractor, or in another business
relationship other than that of a customer, proving "control or
direction" over that third party should not be so presumptively
difficult. Such relationships often involve contractual relationships in
which the vendor or other business partner is contractually required to
perform in a certain manner. Moreover, these types of relationships
are not already specifically addressed by 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c), covering
contributory infringement where a defendant has sold a product with
246. Am. Patent Dev. Corp., LLC v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236-37 (D.
Del. 2009), discussed supra at notes 141-152. But see Note, Alice Juwon Ahn, Finding
Vicarious Liability in U.S. Patent Law: The "Control or Direction" Standard for Joint
Infringement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.. 149, 174 (2009) (arguing that accused direct infringers
should be vicariously liable for the actions of third parties where they "(1) have taught or
instructed the other party, and (2) derived an obvious and direct financial benefit").
247. Cf BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1381 (dismissing BMC's argument that "the data
themselves provide instructions or directions" but dismissing that theory for lack of evidence).
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no non-infringing use, and thus are not as likely to conflict with the
statutory scheme for indirect infringement.248
Whether a defendant to a direct infringement claim is liable for
steps performed by a third party should depend on the answer to two
questions:
Does the defendant's alleged "control or direction" relate to the
specific technology accused of infringement?
If so, did the defendant require the third party to perform the
relevant limitations of the claim in the manner provided for in
those limitations?
If the answer to both of these questions is "yes," then there is
sufficient control or direction over the third party.
In re Katz suggested the first part of this test.2 4 9 The court in In
re Katz recognized that there could be many different types of control
and independence in the relationship between DirecTV and West, but
what mattered was the extent to which DirecTV controlled West's
conduct related to the interactive phone systems accused of
infringement.2 50 The court recognized that if there was evidence that
DirecTV controlled West's conduct related to the interactive phone
system, then there was an issue of fact regarding whether DirecTV
was simply "'contracting out steps of a patented process to another
entity,,, 2 5 1 such that it could be found to have controlled or directed
the actions of West.2 52 Simply put, courts should analyze whether the
defendant's alleged control related to the steps allegedly performed
by third parties.
The second part of the test-did the defendant require the third
party to perform the relevant limitations of the claim in the manner
provided for in those limitations -is suggested by Fisher-Barton
Blades, Inc. v. Blount, Inc.2 53 and Rowe International Corp. v. Ecast,
Inc.2 54 In Fisher-Barton, the claims covered blades that were heat
treated to achieve a certain hardness, and the evidence showed that
the party that performed the heat treating was directed by the
248. Discussed supra notes 76, 242-245 and accompanying text.
249. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, Case No. 07-CV-2322-RGK
(FFMx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72134, at *64 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2009).
250. Id.
251. Id. at *62 (quoting BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
252. Id. at *65.
253. Fisher-Barton Blades, Inc. v. Blount, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Wisc. 2008).
254. Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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defendant to heat treat the blades such that they achieved a certain
hardness. 25 5 Had the claims in Fisher-Barton required a specific type
of heat-treatment with specific process conditions, and had the third
party been left with the discretion to perform the heat treatment in any
manner it saw fit, a different result would have been appropriate.
In Rowe, the defendant had required the jukebox manufacturers
to manufacture jukeboxes according to certain specifications that fell
within the limitations of the patent claims related to a system for
256
connecting jukeboxes to the internet. In contrast, in Gammino v.
Cellco Partnership257 and epicRealm Licensing, LP v. Franklin Covey
Co.,258 the defendants merely paid for services and did not require
those services to be provided in a specific manner, and thus there was
not sufficient "control or direction." Thus, without explicitly asking
whether the defendant required the third party to perform the relevant
limitations of the claim in the manner provided for in those
limitations, many of the cases decided since BMC Resources and
Muniauction have based their decisions on similar rationales.
This two part test is consistent with the Restatement (Third) of
Agency. According to the Restatement:
A principal is subject to liability to a third party harmed by an
agent's conduct when the agent's conduct is within the scope of
the agent's actual authority or ratified by the principal; and
(1) the agent's conduct is tortious, or
(2) the agent's conduct, if that of the principal, would subject
the principal to tort liability.259
Even if a principal does not have such complete control over a
third party such that the principal would be vicariously liable for all of
the third parties' actions, if the principal requires the third party to
perform actions in a certain manner that fall within the limitations of a
patent claim, holding the principal responsible for the steps performed
by the third party, and ultimately for patent infringement, is consistent
with the Restatement. According to section 2.01 of the Restatement:
"An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the
255. Fisher-Barton, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
256. Rowe, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
257. Gammino v. Cellco Partnership, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398-99 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
258. epicRealm Licensing, LP v. Franklin Covey Co., 644 F. Supp. 2d 806, 816, 823 (E.D.
Tex. 2008).
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04 (2006) (emphasis added).
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agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." 26 0 "Actual
authority, as defined in § 2.01, is created by a principal's
manifestation to an agent that, as reasonably understood by the agent,
expresses the principal's assent that the agent take action on the
principal's behalf."26 1 A contract requiring a third party to perform
certain steps of a process in a certain manner would create actual
authority for the third party to act on behalf of the principal, at least
with respect to the performance of those steps in the manner required.
Thus, the author's proposed test, and finding "control or direction" in
the absence of vicarious liability for all of the actions of third party, is
consistent with the Restatement of Agency. 262
The proposed two part test would lead to a different result under
the facts of Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc.263 The claims in Emtel
required "diagnosing a medical condition" of a patient at a remote site
and "providing instructions via said video-conferencing system."264
Other than requiring that a diagnosis of a patient be made at a remote
site and that a course of treatment be conveyed over a video
conferencing system, the claims did not require that a diagnosis be
performed in a specific manner. The court in Emtel focused on the
discretion that the third party doctors had in the way in which a
diagnosis was performed.2 65 But in one important sense, the doctors
did not have discretion: a certain number of times they were required
to diagnosis patients over a video-conferencing system. 26 6 The system
260. Id. § 2.01.
261. Id. § 3.01.
262. Arguably, the Restatement (Third) of Agency would support finding a defendant
liable for steps performed by third parties in some situations where the performance of the steps
in the manner covered by the claims were not mandated by the defendant. According to the
Restatement, "An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied in the
principal's manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the
principal's objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal's manifestations and
objectives when the agent determines how to act." Id. § 2.02(l). Following this provision, even
if a defendant did not require a third party to perform certain steps in the manner provided in
patent claim limitations, if the third party performed steps in the manner provided for in the
claims and those action were "necessary or incidental to achieving the principal's objectives,"
the defendant would the liable for the third parties' actions.
263. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
264. Id. at 815-16.
265. Id. at 838 (The court observed that in a hospital-doctor relationship, "[b]ecause a
hospital is 'interested in only the results, and the contracting party independently determines the
details of the method by which the desired results are attained, an independent contractor
relationship exists and the doctrine of respondeat superior has no application.") (quoting Berel v.
HCA Health Servs. Of Tex., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. App. 1994)).
266. The Emtel court observed that the Court in Rowe Int'l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2008), "relied on the fact that the contract imposed specific
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operator's control over the doctors related to the remote diagnosis
network accused of infringement and the system operator controlled
the manner in which the step was performed.26 7 Specifically, they
required that each doctor participating in the system performed a
certain number of diagnoses and recommendations of courses of
treatment over the network, and that was all that was required of the
claim limitation at issue. 268 Accordingly, the- patentee should have
been permitted to proceed with its infringement claim in Emtel.
The two-part test proposed herein should simplify the inquiry by
lawyers and courts examining whether a defendant has "control or
direction" over a third party, and minimize the extent to which it is
necessary to consider where specific cases might fall along the control
or direction continuum.
C. Remaining Loopholes
Even with the above standard for "control or direction" imposing
liability on defendants who contract with third parties and require
them to perform a step in a specific manner covered by method
claims, a potentially giant loophole would remain: parties could
contract with third parties in foreign jurisdictions to perform one or
more steps of an accused method, and thus avoid infringement. As the
Federal Circuit held in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., "a
process cannot be used 'within' the United States as required by
section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within the
country."269 Accordingly, even if a defendant outsources the
performance of steps of a patented method and required those steps to
be performed in a manner that correlates precisely with the limitations
of a claim, if that third party were located outside the United States,
the proposed, or any, "control or direction" standard would not aid the
patentee. This potential loophole further reinforces the importance of
drafting to avoid claims that require actions by multiple actors.
instructions and requirements on how the third party is to perform the steps necessary for
infringement." Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
267. Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 815-17.
268. Id. The Emtel court observed that "a contracting party is not vicariously liable for the
actions of an independent contractor unless that party controls the details of the independent
contractor's work to such an extent that the contractor cannot perform the work as he chooses."
Id. at 837. Even if Muniauction could be read to require vicarious liability in order to find
"control or direction," because the defendant in Emtel did control the doctor's diagnoses in one
relevant detail - it required that such diagnoses be given over the video-conferencing system -
the test should have been satisfied in Emtel given the correlation between the defendant's
control and the claim limitation at issue.
269. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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It could also be argued that the proposed test would allow
principals to easily avoid infringement by simply having a third party
perform a step of a claimed method but giving an "off-the-record"
indication to the third party about the manner in which the step should
be performed.2 70 While this could be a practical issue of proof, the
risk of missing some cases of patent infringement in which a principal
avoids being found liable for such infringement because of clever
deception is not grounds for imposing infringement liability on parties
who do not actually direct or control third parties who perform steps
as a part of arms-length relationships. Given the general rule that
"[d]irect infringement requires a party to perform or use each and
every step or element of a claimed method or product," 2 7 1 the
situations in which direct patent infringement can be based on the
actions of multiple parties should be relatively few.
VIII.CONCLUSION
Since BMC Resources, there has been uncertainty about how to
prove "control or direction" over a third party by a "mastermind"
sufficient to hold the mastermind liable for steps performed by the
third party and liable for direct infringement. Defendants rarely
should be found to exert sufficient control over their customers such
that they could be held liable for direct infringement based on those
customers' actions. For vendors, subcontractors, or agents, the two-
part test advanced in this article should simplify the determination of
whether sufficient "control or direction" exists.
270. Under §§ 2.01 and 3.01 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, any "manifestations to
the agent" that the "principal wishes the agent to act" are sufficient to prove actual agency. See
supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text. Accordingly, provided a patentee could prove that
a defendant required a third party to act in a certain way, no formal written agreement with such
a requirement should be necessary for the defendant to be liable for the third party's actions.
271. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Corp., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)).
457
* * *
